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Abstract. The epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation as-
signs belief to arguments. This is valuable in dialogical argumentation
where one agent can model the beliefs another agent has in the argu-
ments and this can be harnessed to make strategic choices of arguments
to present. In this paper, we extend this epistemic approach by also rep-
resenting the belief in attacks. We investigate properties of this proposal
and compare it to the constellations approach showing neither subsumes
the other.
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1 Introduction
Abstract argumentation as proposed by Dung [8] provides an important formal-
ism for representing and evaluating arguments and counterarguments. Proposals
for probabilistic argumentation extend this to address aspects of uncertainty aris-
ing in argumentation. The two main approaches to probabilistic argumentation
are the constellations and the epistemic approaches [14]. In the constellations
approach, the uncertainty is in the topology of the graph. This approach is
useful when one agent is not sure what arguments and attacks another agent
is aware of, and so this can be captured by a probability distribution over the
space of possible argument graphs. In the epistemic approach, the topology
of the argument graph is fixed, but there is uncertainty as to the degree to which
each argument is believed.
In this paper, we extend the epistemic approach with a probability distri-
bution over the power set of attacks which we use to represent the uncertainty
in each attack. To illustrate, we consider a listener to a political discussion on
the radio. This is a situation where the listener acquires all the arguments and
attacks that are presented, but does not add or delete arguments or attacks.
The argument graph is given in Figure 1. Often the listener would evaluate the
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arguments and attacks. For instance, she may have a low belief in A3 because
she has found World Bank predictions to be unreliable in the past, and she may
have a high belief in argument A2, but a low belief in the attack by A2 on A1. As
a result, she may have a high belief in A1. Note, in the constellations approach,
it is not possible to represent all the arguments and attacks in one graph, and
then assign belief to them.
A1 = The economy is not doing well, and
the rich are not paying enough tax, there-
fore we should increase taxes on the rich.
A2 = Government statistics
show that the rich are in-
creasingly moving abroad.
A3 = World Bank data sug-
gests that the economy of
the country is improving.
Fig. 1. Example of an argument graph acquired by a listener to a debate.
Often uncertainty in attacks arises because “real-world” arguments are nor-
mally enthymemes (i. e. some or all of the premises and/or the claim are implicit).
When an agent posits an enthymeme, the recipient decodes it to recover the in-
tended argument. This creates a risk that the recipient decodes it differently to
the way intended (as illustrated by the attack of A2 on A1 in Figure 1).
A potentially valuable role for the extended epistemic approach is in sup-
porting an agent (X) when arguing with another agent (Y). Agent X can model
agent Y to reflect the arguments and attacks that X thinks Y believes. This ex-
tends proposals for using the epistemic approach for user modelling in persuasion
dialogues [16, 15].
The contributions of this paper are: (1) a set of constraints on probability
distributions that take into account uncertainty of arguments and attacks; (2)
results on the constraints showing inter-relationships between them; (3) results
showing how with certain combinations of constraints recover and generalize
Dung’s dialectical semantics; and (4) a comparison with the constellations ap-
proach showing how neither subsumes the other. All proofs are available online3.
2 Preliminaries
We start with a brief review of abstract argumentation as proposed by [8]. An
argument graph (or a framework) is a directed graph G = (A,R), where
A is the set of arguments and R ⊆ A × A is the set of attacks. The way we
decide which arguments can be accepted or rejected (or neither) is called a
3 http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/a.hunter/papers/extended epistemic full.pdf
semantics. We focus on the argument-based approach [5, 1] and the adaptation
of the attack-based approach from [2].
An argument labeling is a total function L : A → {in, out, und} [1, 5]. By
in(L), out(L) and und(L) we denote the arguments mapped respectively to in, out
and und(ecided) by L. We will often write a labeling as a triple (I,O, U), where
I, O and U are sets of arguments mapped to in, out and und. We say that a set
of elements attacks another element if it contains an appropriate attacker. We
can now introduce the notion of legality, on which our semantics are based.
Definition 1. An argument A ∈ A is an attacker of B ∈ A iff (A,B) ∈ R.
Let L : A → {in, out, und} be a labeling:
– X ∈ in(L) is legally in iff all its attackers are in out(L).
– X ∈ out(L) is legally out iff it has an attacker in in(L).
– X ∈ und(L) is legally und iff not all of its attackers are in out(L) and it
does not have an attacker in in(L).
Definition 2. Let L : A → {in, out, und} be a labeling:
(cf) L is conflict-free iff it holds that if A ∈ in(L), then none of its attackers
is in in(L), and every A ∈ out(L) is legally out
(ad) L is admissible iff every A ∈ in(L) is legally in and every A ∈ out(L) is
legally out.
(co) L is complete if it is admissible and every A ∈ und(L) is legally und.
Additionally, a complete labeling is stable (st) if und(L) = ∅, it is preferred (pr)
if in(L) is maximal wrt. ⊆, and it is grounded (gr) if in(L) is minimal wrt. ⊆.
In Dung’s semantics, attacks are seen as secondary to arguments. For exam-
ple, ensuring that no attack on a given argument is accepted is equivalent to
making sure that no argument carrying out an attack is accepted. However, this
correspondence does not always hold for various generalizations of Dung’s graph,
in which a given conflict may not be successful due to preferences, probabilities,
or when it is a target of an attack as well [4]. Therefore, the status assigned
to a given attack is not necessarily the same as assigned to its source. We will
now adapt the approach from [2] and focus on the extended labelings, which
are total functions L? : A ∪ R → {in, out, und}. We introduce the notion of an
extended attacker (attacker?), which is now a conflict, not an argument, and the
attackee can be both an argument and a relation.
Definition 3. For an attack α = (A,B) ∈ R, the source of α is src(α) = A and
the target of α is trg(α) = B. An attack α ∈ R is an attacker? 1) of B ∈ A
iff B = trg(α), and 2) of β ∈ R iff trg(α) = src(β).
By replacing attacker with attacker? in the previous definitions and max-
imizing/minimizing attacks as well as arguments, we obtain the attack-based
semantics, further distinguished with ?. We have the following correspondence
between these two families of semantics [2]. Please observe that that extended
labelings can, in general, only be projected to their corresponding ordinary la-
belings if they are at least complete.
Proposition 1. If L = (I,O, U) is a σ–labeling, where σ ∈ {cf, ad, co, pr, gr,
st}, then L? = (I ∪{α | src(α) ∈ I}, O∪{α | src(α) ∈ O}, U ∪{α | src(α) ∈ U})
is a σ?–labeling. If L? = (I?, O?, U?) is a δ?–labeling, where δ ∈ {co, pr, gr, st},
then L = (I? ∩ A, O? ∩ A, U? ∩ A) is a δ–labeling.
We use σ(G) to denote the set of labelings of G according to the semantics
σ ∈ {cf, ad, co, pr, gr, st, cf?, ad?, co?, pr?, gr?, st?}. We will say that a set of
arguments S is a σ–extension iff there exists a σ–labeling L s. t. in(L) = S.
Example 1. Consider the graph G1 below. The admissible labelings are L1 = (∅,
∅, {A,B,C}), L2 = ({A}, {B}, {C}), L3 = ({B}, {A}, {C}) and L4 = ({B},
{A,C}, ∅). Apart from L3, all of them are complete. L1 is grounded, L2 and L4
are preferred, and L4 is stable.
A B C
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Now consider the graph G2 above. The admissible labelings are L1 = (∅, ∅,
{A,B,C}), L2 = ({A}, ∅, {B,C}), L3 = ({A}, {B}, {C}), and L4 = ({A,C},
{B}, ∅). L4 is the single complete, preferred, stable and grounded labeling. The
admissible? labelings of G2 are L
?
1 = (∅, ∅, {A,B,C, r1, r2}), L?2 = ({A}, ∅,
{B,C, r1, r2}), L?3 = ({r1}, ∅, {A,B,C, r2}), L?4 = ({r1}, {B}, {A,C, r2}),
L?5 = ({r1}, {r2}, {A,B,C}), L?6 = ({r1}, {B, r2}, {A,C}), L?7 = ({A, r1},
∅, {B,C, r2}), L?8 = ({A, r1}, {B}, {C, r2}), L?9 = ({A, r1}, {r2}, {B,C}),
L?10 = ({A, r1}, {B, r2}, {A,C}), L?11 = ({r1, C}, {r2}, {A,B}), L?12 = ({r1, C},
{B, r2}, {A}), L?13 = ({A, r1, C}, {r2}, {B}) and L?14 = ({A, r1, C}, {B, r2}, ∅).
L?14 is the single complete
?, preferred?, stable? and grounded? labeling.
We can observe that even though every argument-based labeling has a corre-
sponding extended one, the removal of attacks from the extended labeling does
not necessarily give us a standard one (e. g. L?11 and L
?
12).
3 Constellations Approach
We review the constellations approach [13] which extends [7] and [19]. It allows
representation of the uncertainty over the topology of the graph: Each subgraph
of the original graph is assigned a probability to represent the chances of it being
the actual argument graph of the agent. It can be used to model what arguments
and attacks an agent is aware of.
Definition 4. For G = (A,R) and G′ = (A′,R′), the subgraph relation, denoted
v, is defined as G′ v G iff A′ ⊆ A and R′ ⊆ (A′×A′)∩R. The set of subgraphs
of G is Sub(G) = {G′ | G′ v G}. A subgraph (A′,R′) is full iff A′ ⊆ A and
R′ = (A′ ×A′) ∩R. A subgraph (A′,R′) is spanning iff A′ = A and R′ ⊆ R.
If our uncertainty is about which arguments appear in the graph, then only
the full (induced) subgraphs of the argument graph have non-zero probability.
If we are only uncertain about which attacks appear, then it is the spanning
subgraphs of the argument graph that can have non-zero probability.
Definition 5. A subgraph distribution is a function P c : Sub(G) → [0, 1]
with
∑
G′∈Sub(G) P
c(G′) = 1. A subgraph distribution P c is a full subgraph
distribution iff if (A′,R′) is not a full subgraph, then P c((A′,R′)) = 0. A sub-
graph distribution P c is a spanning subgraph distribution iff iff if (A′,R′)
is not a spanning subgraph, P c((A′,R′)) = 0.
Determining the probability that a set of arguments is an extension (labeling)
of a particular type (e. g. grounded, preferred, etc.) is is done by collecting the
probabilities of the subgraphs producing the desired labelings. In a similar fash-
ion, we can derive the probability of an argument being accepted in a labeling
of a given type.
Definition 6. For S ⊆ A and σ ∈ {cf, ad, co, pr, gr, st}, the probability that
L : S → {in, out, und} is a σ–labeling is:
Pσ(L) =
∑
G′∈Sub(G) s.t. L∈σ(G′)
P c(G′)
Definition 7. Given a semantics σ ∈ {ad, co, pr, gr, st}, the probability that A ∈
A is in in a σ–labeling is
Pσ(A) =
∑
G′∈Sub(G) s.t. L∈σ(G′) and A∈in(L)
P (G′)
Example 2. Consider the graph G = ({A,B}, {(A,B)}. Its subgraphs are G1 =
({A,B}, {(A,B)}, G2 = ({A,B}, ∅), G3 = ({A}, ∅), G4 = ({B}, ∅) and G5 =
(∅, ∅). Out of them, G1, G3, G4 and G5 are full, and G1 and G2 are spanning.
Consider the following subgraph distribution P c: P c(G1) = 0.09, P
c(G2) = 0.81,
P c(G3) = 0.01 and P
c(G4) = 0.09 and P
c(G5) = 0. The probability of a given
set being a grounded extension is as follows: Pgr({A,B}) = P c(G2) = 0.81;
Pgr({A}) = P c(G1) + P c(G3) = 0.1; Pgr({B}) = P c(G4) = 0.09; and Pgr({}) =
P c(G5) = 0. Therefore Pgr(A) = 0.91 and Pgr(B) = 0.9.
4 Extended Epistemic Approach
In the original version of the epistemic approach [22, 14, 17, 3, 18], an argument
graph has an associated probability distribution over the sets of arguments. From
this, we derive the probability of a single argument and interpret it as the belief
that an agent has in it (i. e. the degree to which the agent believes the premises
and the conclusion drawn from those premises). We say that an agent believes
an argument A to some degree when P (A) > 0.5, disbelieves an argument to
some degree when P (A) < 0.5, and neither believes nor disbelieves an argument
when P (A) = 0.5. Here we extend the approach with uncertainty over attacks.
For this, we introduce the probability of attack (i.e. the degree of belief that the
attacker does indeed attack the attackee). We use two functions in the definition
because we want to investigate the interplay between them.
Definition 8. An epistemic bidistribution is a pair (P a, P r) where
– P a is a function P a : 2A → [0, 1] with ∑S⊆A P a(S) = 1 (argument belief
distribution).
– P r is a function P r : 2R → [0, 1] with ∑S⊆R P r(S) = 1 (attack belief
distribution).
The probability of an argument A is P a(A) =
∑
S⊆A s.t. A∈S P
a(S).
The probability of an attack α is P r(α) =
∑
S⊆R s.t. α∈S P
r(S). Finally,
let P b(X) denote P a(X) (resp. P r(X)) when X ∈ A (resp. X ∈ R).
In order to simplify the notation, we drop the brackets for representing the
probability of an attack relation, i. e., for (A,B) ∈ R, instead of P r((A,B)) we
write P r(A,B).
The epistemic probability distributions can be constrained by imposing ra-
tionality postulates. In what follows we will build up on some of the postulates
from [18] and introduce some new ones. The previous results can be retrieved
by considering bidistributions in which all attacks are believed. We separate our
new approaches into two families of postulates.
We start with the independent family of postulates in Definition 9 and give
results on inter-relationships in Figure 2 where Pµ is the set of bidistributions
satisfying postulate µ in G. The family is called independent because there is
no dependence imposed between belief in attacks and belief in attackers, i.e. the
probabilities assigned to an attack α and to src(α) are not necessarily related.
RAT?, TER?, COH?, and OPT? require that both the attacker and the attack
itself need to be believed in order to affect the attackee, or that either of them
can be disbelieved in order for belief in the target. For RAT? (resp. STC?), if
an attacker and its attack are believed, then the attackee is not believed (resp.
disbelieved). As a dual for STC?, PRO? ensures that if an attack and attackee are
believed, the attacker is not believed. TRU? requires that an argument is believed
when there is no evidence to the contrary. By DIS?, an argument can only be
disbelieved for a reason. TER? simply limits beliefs to three values corresponding
precisely to the in, out and und statuses from the standard semantics. The ABIN?
postulate prohibits being undecided about beliefs. Finally, while all the previous
properties consider belief and disbelief, the COH? and OPT? properties give
margins for probability assignments—one focuses on the upper, the other on the
lower bound. By varying the use of also undecided attacks, we can specialize our
axioms further, as seen in the case of RPRO? and RCOH?.
Definition 9. (The independent family of postulates). An epistemic bidis-
tribution (P a, P r) is:
(RAT?) rational? if for all A,B ∈ A s.t. (A,B) ∈ R and P r(A,B) > 0.5,
P a(A) > 0.5 implies P a(B) ≤ 0.5.
(STC?) strict? if for all A,B ∈ A, s.t. (A,B) ∈ R and P r(A,B) > 0.5,
P a(A) > 0.5 implies P a(B) < 0.5.
(PRO?) protective? if for all A,B ∈ A s.t. (A,B) ∈ R and P r(A,B) > 0.5,
P a(B) > 0.5 implies P a(A) < 0.5.
(RPRO?) restricted protective? if for all A,B ∈ A s.t. (A,B) ∈ R and
P r(A,B) ≥ 0.5, P a(B) > 0.5 implies P a(A) < 0.5.
(TRU?) trusting? if for every B ∈ A, it holds that if for all C ∈ A s.t.
(C,B) ∈ R, either P a(C) < 0.5, or P r(C,B) < 0.5, then P a(B) > 0.5.
(DIS?) discharging? if for every B ∈ A, if P a(B) < 0.5, then there exists
C ∈ A s.t. (C,B) ∈ R, P r(C,B) > 0.5 and P a(C) > 0.5.
(TER?) ternary? if for all X ∈ A ∪R, P b(X) ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.
(ABIN?) attack binary? if for all X ∈ R, P r(X) 6= 0.5.
(COH?) coherent? if for all A,B ∈ A s.t. (A,B) ∈ R and P r(A,B) > 0.5,
P a(A) ≤ 1− P a(B).
(RCOH?) restricted coherent? if for all A,B ∈ A, s.t. (A,B) ∈ R and
P r(A,B) ≥ 0.5, P a(A) ≤ 1− P a(B).
(OPT?) optimistic? if for every A ∈ A, it holds that
P a(A) ≥ 1−∑
B s.t. (B,A)∈R,P r(B,A)>0.5 and Pa(B)>0.5 P
a(B).
In the independent family, the belief we have in an attacker does not constrain
the belief we may have in its attack. We consider it an intuitive modeling, as we
do not have to believe two arguments in order to acknowledge a conflict between
them. Imagine two people witnessing a robbery, one claiming that the criminal
ran away in a car, the other that he used a bike. The statements are clearly
conflicting and we can believe the attacks between them independently of the
belief we have in the witnesses. Similarly, we do not need to believe a given
attack even if we believe the arguments participating in it, as exemplified in the
introduction.
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Fig. 2. Relationships for the independent family of postulates where Pµ1 → Pµ2 de-
notes Pµ1(G) ⊆ Pµ2(G).
We present a second family of postulates in Definition 10, called the de-
pendent family, and give results on inter-relationships in Figure 3. This second
family is motivated by the observation that in some situations (e. g. when ar-
gument graphs are obtained from logical knowledge bases), it is natural to ex-
pect that there is a dependence between belief in an attacker and its attack.
Moreover, in many approaches that explicitly include the attacks in extensions
and labelings, the conflicts need to conform to the same semantics as the ar-
guments. Consequently, we can demand that the belief in an argument affects
the belief in its attacks and vice versa. For this, we introduce the UNI?, SUN?
and WUN? postulates below. Similarly, we also present the attack postulates,
which constrain the belief both in the attacked argument and the conflict whose
source is attacked, thus implicitly acknowledging the dependency between the
two. Moreover, while in the independent family the beliefs in the attack and
the attacker had to be mentioned explicitly due to their independence, in this
family we consider just the attack itself. This also reflects the intuition behind
the attack–based approach.
P
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PTER?
PASCOH? ∩ PTER? =
PAPRO? ∩ PASTC? ∩ PTER?
Fig. 3. Relationships for the dependent family of postulates where Pµ1 → Pµ2 denotes
Pµ1(G) ⊆ Pµ2(G).
Definition 10. (The dependent family of postulates). An epistemic bidistri-
bution (P a, P r) is:
(UNI?) unified? if for all (A,B) ∈ R, P r(A,B) = P a(A)
(SUN?) semi–unified? if for all (A,B) ∈ R, P a(A) > 0.5 iff P r(A,B) > 0.5
and P a(A) < 0.5 iff P r(A,B) < 0.5
(WUN?) weakly unified? if for all (A,B) ∈ R, either both P r(A,B) ≥ 0.5
and P a(A) ≥ 0.5 or both P r(A,B) ≤ 0.5 and P a(A) ≤ 0.5.
(ARAT?) attack rational? iff for every α ∈ R, if P r(α) > 0.5 and α is an
attacker? of X ∈ A ∪R, then P b(X) ≤ 0.5.
(ASTC?) attack strict? iff for every α ∈ R, if P r(α) > 0.5 and α is an
attacker? of X ∈ A ∪R, then P b(X) < 0.5.
(APRO?) attack protective? iff for every X ∈ A∪R and α ∈ R s.t. α is an
attacker? of X, if P b(X) > 0.5, then P r(α) < 0.5.
(ATRU?) attack trusting? iff for every X ∈ A∪R, it holds that if for every
attacker? β ∈ R of X it is the case that P r(β) < 0.5, then P b(X) > 0.5.
(ADIS?) attack discharging? iff for every X ∈ A ∪R, if P b(X) < 0.5, then
there exists an attacker? β ∈ R of X s.t. P r(β) > 0.5.
(ACOH?) attack coherent? iff for every X ∈ A ∪R and α ∈ R s.t. α is an
attacker? of X, if P r(α) > 0.5, then P r(α) ≤ 1− P b(X).
(ASCOH?) attack strongly coherent? iff for every X ∈ A ∪ R and α ∈ R
s.t. α is an attacker? of X, if P r(α) ≥ 0.5, then P r(α) ≤ 1− P b(X).
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Fig. 4. Classes of probability functions where Pµ1 → Pµ2 denotes Pµ1(G) ⊆ Pµ2(G).
Some relationships between the two postulate families are given in Figure 4.
Although the independent family is more argument-driven, while the depen-
dent family is more attack-driven, there is a meeting point between them. In
particular, by the use of postulates that tie the belief we have in a conflict to
the belief we have in its source, we can up to a certain degree replace one family
with the other.
Example 3. Consider again G2 from Example 1 and an epistemic bidistribution
(P a, P r) (partially) defined through the following constraints:
P a(A) = 0.9 P a(B) = 0.5 P a(C) = 0.6
P r(r1) = 0.7 P
r(r2) = 0.6
Then (P a, P r) is (among others) rational?, weakly unified?, and (trivially) attack
trusting?. It is, for example, not strict?, not protective?, and not attack strongly
coherent?.
5 Relationship with Classical Semantics
In order to compare the extended epistemic approach with Dung’s classical ap-
proach, we introduce the notions of epistemic and extended epistemic labelings.
Elements that are believed (disbelieved or neither) are simply assigned in (re-
spectively, out and und). We will show which postulates need to be satisfied in
order for the (extended) epistemic labelings to conform to the desired classical
semantics and vice versa.
Definition 11. Let (P a, P r) be an epistemic bidistribution. The epistemic la-
beling is LPa = (I,O, U), where I = {A ∈ A | P a(A) > 0.5}, O = {A ∈
A | P a(A) < 0.5}, and U = {A ∈ A | P a(A) = 0.5}. The extended epis-
temic labeling is L?Pa,P r = (I,O, U), where I = {X ∈ A ∪R | P b(X) > 0.5},
O = {X ∈ A ∪R | P b(X) < 0.5}, and U = {X ∈ A ∪R | P b(X) = 0.5}.
We will first show how our independent family of postulates (i. e. Def. 9)
relates to the classical notions. We can draw a connection between the epistemic
bidistributions and the labelings of a subgraph of the original graph, which is
obtained by considering only those attacks that are believed:
Definition 12. Let (P a, P r) be an epistemic bidistribution. The set of believed
attacks is BAtts(P r) = {(A,B) ∈ R | P r(A,B) > 0.5}. The subgraph of G
induced by P r is G′ = (A,BAtts(P r)).
Proposition 2. Let (P a, P r) be an epistemic bidistribution and G′ = (A,BAtts(P r))
the subgraph of G induced by P r.
– (P a, P r) ∈ PRAT?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) iff LPa ∈ cf(G′).
– (P a, P r) ∈ PPRO?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) iff LPa ∈ ad(G′).
– (P a, P r) ∈ PPRO?(G)∩PSTC?(G)∩PDIS?(G)∩PTRU?(G) iff LPa ∈ co(G′).
We can observe that although one attack distribution induces only one sub-
graph, a single subgraph can be induced by multiple distributions. This is due
to the fact that the removal of the attacks depends on whether an attack is
believed at all, not on the degree of this belief. Moreover, there can be infinitely
many argument distributions associated with a single complete labeling due to
the fact that any of the values from [0, 0.5) (or (0.5, 1]) can lead to an out (or
in) assignment of a given labeling. Although this is to be expected taking into
account the fact that probabilistic semantics carry more information than the
classical ones, we would also like to distinguish those probability functions that
can be uniquely associated with a given subgraph and its complete labelings.
We thus propose the definition of complete probability bidistributions; a given
subgraph can be induced only by a single ternary and attack binary distribution,
while ternary, trusting, disapproving and coherent postulates lead to a tighter
relation with the labelings:
Definition 13. An epistemic bidistribution (P a, P r) is complete iff (P a, P r) ∈
PCOH?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) ∩ PTRU?(G) ∩ PTER?(G) ∩ PABIN?(G).
From this, we can further define the preferred, complete and stable bidistribu-
tions that lead to appropriate labelings in the associated subgraph by maximiz-
ing or minimizing particular assignments, similarly as in the classical semantics.
In this case, instead of focusing on in, out and und assignments, we look for
probabilities 1, 0 and 0.5.
Although the extended epistemic approach is quite general, the epistemic
labelings without any constraints on the attack distributions are connected to the
labellings of the subgraphs of a given framework, not necessarily the framework
itself. However, if we apply the dependency postulates from the dependent family
(Definition 10)— in particular, the semi-unified one—we can observe that we can
focus on the original graph again. The only difference wrt. the previous results
is the use of the restricted, not standard protectiveness.
Proposition 3. The following holds:
– If L ∈ cf(G), then there exists (P a, P r) ∈ PRAT?(G)∩PDIS?(G)∩PSUN?(G)
s.t. L = LPa .
– If L ∈ ad(G), then there exists (P a, P r) ∈ PRPRO?(G)∩PDIS?(G)∩PSUN?(G)
s.t. L = LPa .
– If L ∈ co(G), then there exists (P a, P r) ∈ PRPRO?(G)∩PSTC?(G)∩PDIS?(G)∩
PTRU?(G) ∩ PSUN?(G) s.t. L = LPa .
– If (P a, P r) ∈ PRAT?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) ∩ PSUN?(G), then LPa ∈ cf(G).
– If (P a, P r) ∈ PRPRO?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) ∩ PSUN?(G), then LPa ∈ ad(G).
– If (P a, P r) ∈ PRPRO?(G)∩PSTC?(G)∩PDIS?(G)∩PTRU?(G)∩PSUN?(G),
then LPa ∈ co(G).
This leads to the following complete probability bidistribution, which can
uniquely describe the complete labelings of the underlying framework. Using
this, we can also retrieve the preferred, grounded and stable labellings as for the
classical case (as discussed in Section 2).
Definition 14. An epistemic bidistribution (P a, P r) is jointly complete iff
(P a, P r) ∈ PSUN?(G) ∩ PRCOH?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) ∩ PTRU?(G) ∩ PTER?(G).
Let us now focus on the extended classical semantics. As we could have
already observed in Example 1, the admissible? labelings were not necessarily
corresponding to the admissible ones. However, we can easily grasp it with our
attack epistemic postulates.
Proposition 4. The following holds:
– (P a, P r) ∈ PWUN?(G) ∩ PARAT?(G) ∩ PADIS?(G) iff L?Pa,P r ∈ cf?(G).
– (P a, P r) ∈ PWUN?(G) ∩ PAPRO?(G) ∩ PADIS?(G) iff L?Pa,P r ∈ ad?(G).
– (P a, P r) ∈ PSUN?(G)∩PAPRO?(G)∩PASTC?(G)∩PADIS?(G)∩PATRU?(G)
iff L?Pa,P r ∈ co?(G).
The fact that the complete? labelings correspond to bidistributions satisfying
the SUN? postulate gives us one more important result. In particular, under the
SUN? postulate we can replace the other postulates from the dependent family
with their counterparts from the independent family. This also means that we
can use the jointly complete bidistributions in order to uniquely retrieve the
extended labelings of G that are at least complete?.
Theorem 1. Let (P a, P r) be an epistemic bidistribution. Then L?Pa,P r ∈ co?(G)
iff (P a, P r) ∈ PSUN?(G) ∩ PRPRO?(G) ∩ PSTC?(G) ∩ PDIS?(G) ∩ PTRU?(G).
These results show that our new proposal for epistemic probabilities can
generalize a wider range of argumentation semantics than the original one [18].
Moreover, what we have presented can be easily extended to handle the attack-
based semantics from [24] and recursive attacks from [2].
6 Comparison with Constellations Approach
The reasoning behind the epistemic and constellations approaches is different,
with the former intended to reflect the belief in arguments and attacks, and the
latter expressing the uncertainty concerning the topology of the graph, e. g., as to
which arguments and attacks are known about or what elements should appear
in the graph. Nevertheless, we can still draw some connections between them.
We can observe that in a subgraph distribution assigning non-zero probability
only to subgraphs without attacks, the grounded extension of each subgraph
would consist of all of its arguments. These extensions and their probabilities
produce an argument distribution. Thus, the constellations approach can up to
some extent mimic the epistemic approach:
Proposition 5. For each argument-belief distribution P a over G, there is a
constellations distribution P c over Sub(G) s.t. for all arguments A in A, P a(A)
= P cgr(A).
In turn, a spanning or full subgraph distribution can be simulated with the
attack or argument belief distribution due to the fact that part of a subgraph
becomes “fixed” and not directly subject to any uncertainty.
Proposition 6. For each spanning subgraph distribution P c over G, there is an
attack belief distribution P r s.t. for all subgraphs G′ v G, and for all sets of
attacks S ⊆ R, if R′ = S, then P c(G′) = P r(S).
Proposition 7. For each full subgraph distribution P c over G, there is an ar-
gument belief distribution P a s.t. for all subgraphs G′ v G, and for all sets of
arguments S ⊆ A, if A′ = S, then P c(G′) = P a(S).
However, we can observe that if a subgraph distribution is neither a full
subgraph distribution nor a spanning subgraph distribution, then the constel-
lations approach cannot be captured by the epistemic approach. Moreover, in
the constellations approach, the marginal value of a given argument (i. e. the
total probability of subgraphs containing this argument) is never less than the
marginal for any attack involving that argument. In contrast, the belief in an
attacker can be greater than then belief in the attack or attackee. This shows
that, in general, the epistemic approach cannot be captured by the constellations
method.
Definition 15. Let P c be a subgraph distribution. The argument marginal
function is Pm(A) =
∑
G′∈Sub(G) s.t. A∈A′ P (G
′). The attack marginal func-
tion is Pm(A,B) =
∑
G′∈Sub(G) s.t. (A,B)∈R′ P (G
′).
Proposition 8. Let P c be a subgraph distribution. For all (A,B) ∈ R, P c(A) ≥
P c(A,B).
Example 4. Consider the graph G1 = ({A,B,C}, {(A,B), (B,A), (C,B)}) and
its subgraphs G2 = ({A,B,C}, {(A,B), (B,A))}) and G3 = ({A,B}, {(A,B)}).
For this graph, we consider the subgraph distribution P c(G1) = 0.3, P
c(G2) =
0.5 and P c(G3) = 0.2, which is neither a full subgraph nor a spanning subgraph
distribution. We cannot use P a or P r to represent P c.
We can now consider an epistemic bidistribution (P a, P r) s.t. P r({A,B}) = 1
and for every set S ⊆ A s.t. A ∈ S, P a(S) = 0 (the remaining assignments are ar-
bitrary as long as we obtain a distribution). Therefore, P a(A) < P a((A,B)). But
there cannot be any subgraph distribution P c for G1 s.t. P
m(A) < Pm((A,B)).
These results show that extended epistemic and constellations approach, al-
though related, do not subsume each other.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the epistemic approach to account for belief in attacks
as well as arguments. We do this by introducing the notion of an epistemic
bidistribution. We then provide two families of postulates that offer a variety of
ways of constraining the bidistributions according to different notions of rational
behaviour, give some relationships between these two families, and show how
these postulates relate to classical semantics for abstract argumentation, and we
show how the extended epistemic and constellations approaches do not subsume
each other.
Important dimensions for probabilistic argumentation include the constella-
tions approach to abstract argumentation (e.g. [7, 19, 20, 6, 9]), the equational
approach to abstract argumentation [10], and probabilistic structured argumen-
tation (e.g. [21, 7, 23]). The extended epistemic approach is complementary to
these existing approaches (see Section 6, for differences with the constellations
approach, and see [10], for differences between the epistemic and equational ap-
proaches).
The epistemic approach is a promising approach to user modelling in per-
suasion where a persuader can model the beliefs in arguments of the persuadee
and update the model during a dialogue [15, 16, 11], and the user model can be
harnessed to make strategic choices of move in a dialogue using decision theory
[12]. The extended epistemic approach offers richer user models, and pontentially
more effective decisions about moves (as indicated by our example in Section 1).
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